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Chile exhibits an immense continuity in its copper policy and the sector’s reliable output 
contributes enormously to the tax revenues of the state. Copper in Chile is thus an 
interesting case because it challenges the presumed failure of neoliberal reforms in Latin 
America. It does this in a number of different ways. First, the sector is a clear success in 
terms of its output and contribution to GDP. Second, private capital and foreign direct 
investment in particular plays a critical role in developing the mining sector. Third, state-
owned CODELCO has stood firmly against multinational companies. And fourth, Chile 
simultaneously  exhibits  a  stability  of  rules  inherited  from  Pinochet’s  neoliberalism; 
labour relations characterised by conflict and co-optation; and a depoliticised mode of 
governance marked by copper policy technopols and an indirect link between copper 
and  social  policy.  This  paper  argues  that  the  Chilean  state  under  La  Concertación 
government  has  played  an  important  ‘steering’  role  by  defusing  the  various  political 
conflicts, contradictions and tensions in copper policy.  
 
Introduction Introduction Introduction Introduction    
 
How should we characterise the changing relationships of state and market in the context 
of neoliberal globalisation – or, in Latin America’s case, in the post-neoliberal era? In 
order  to  answer  this  question,  it  is  important  that  we  closely  examine  the  political 
economy of specific sectors within different countries and attempt to understand the 
varied  impact  of  neoliberalism  on  state-market  relations.  Whilst  many  studies  have 
already  observed  the  shift  towards  more  market-oriented  reforms  in  agriculture, 
manufacturing  and  financial  sectors  (Wise,  2003;  and  WIR,  2009),  the  resource 
extractive  sector  has  also  experienced  a  process  of  market  liberalisation  but  the Globalisation and Copper Policy in Chile, Nem Singh 
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consequences of this have yet to be systematically studied (Sánchez et. al., 2001; and 
WIR, 2007). Meanwhile, the Latin American region is becoming increasingly dependent 
on extractive resources such as petroleum, natural gas, or mining; and tensions abound 
because these resources are subject to various conflicts between governing elites, the 
private sector, social movements, and other groups seeking to make claims of ownership.   
To unravel the politics of neoliberal reform in the Latin Amercian extractive 
sectors, it is necessary to place the reforms in the context of the broader political economy 
of the last 30 years. Since the late 1980s, key mining countries in the region (Peru, Bolivia, 
Brazil)  have  undertaken  reforms  to  change  their  property  rights  regimes,  taxation 
policies, and trade rules in order to attract foreign investment. More fundamentally, there 
were clear attempts to reverse nationalisation, reduce the role of the state and particularly 
state-owned  enterprises  in  mining,  and  to  introduce  low  tax  rates  and  attractive 
investment  packages  in  order  to  increase  Foreign  Direct  Investment  (FDI)  into  the 
region. In response to high prices, transnational corporations (TNCs) have accelerated 
their  investment  into  the  exploration  and  exploitation  of  extractive  resources,  as  is 
illustrated by the purchase of Brazilian firm Vale by Canadian company Inco.1 Today, 
Brazil and Mexico, followed by Chile, are the main recipients of FDI inflows (WIR, 
2007).  These  reforms  can  be  seen  as  responses  to  state-led  industrialisation  and  its 
varying degrees of failure.  
The extent to which these policies were maintained after 2000 differs across 
the region. In Brazil and Chile, mining laws have remained intact and continue to reflect 
the neoliberal reforms of each country, thereby offering stability in terms of rules. Peru 
and Colombia have undertaken further liberalisation and attracted FDI into new mining 
sites, but this has met some resistance (especially in the Peruvian case, see Bebbington et. 
al.  2008).2  Meanwhile,  in  some  countries  such  as  Argentina,  Bolivia,  Ecuador  and 
Venezuela, there were revisions in contracts and tax regimes aimed at increasing state 
control over the industry, imposing stricter environmental regulations, and securing a 
bigger share of windfall profits for the state (Hogenboom, 2010; and WIR, 2007, pp. 59-
60). The latter set of countries is important because they mark a policy shift in Latin 
America from neoliberal to post-neoliberal thinking. 
The  Chilean  case  is  interesting  in  challenging  the  presumed  failure  of 
neoliberal reforms in Latin America in four ways. In terms of output, shared private and 
public production is responsible for 35% of the global copper supply and constitutes 8% 
of the GDP in 2008 (COCHILCO, 2009). For this reason, copper is typically referred to 
as el sueldo de Chile (‘the wage of Chile’) or oro rojo (‘red gold’). Second, private capital, 
but more specifically foreign firms, play a critical role in developing the mining sector in 
terms of technology transfer, foreign direct investment (FDI), and state revenues through 
taxation. This departs from the typically antagonistic relations between state and capital 
found in Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela. Third, state-owned CODELCO has stood Journal of Critical Globalisation Studies, Issue 3 (2010) 
 
 
62 
firmly against multinational companies. One must not forget that the biggest copper 
producer is still state-owned and this demonstrates the capacity of the state to manage 
production in a highly competitive global environment. Finally, the Chilean resource 
model simultaneously exhibits an immense stability of rules that were inherited from 
Pinochet’s neoliberalism, labour relations characterised by conflict and co-optation, and 
depoliticised modes of governance characterised by the extensive presence of technopols 
in copper policy and an indirect link between copper and social policy.   
The neoliberal reforms in the Chilean copper sector thus demonstrate the 
contradictions between an industry requiring greater state management and an ideology 
that holds back such a role for the state. With policy constraints on pursuing a more 
statist agenda, La Concertación government has attempted to adopt a ‘steering’ role and 
negotiate three different sources of pressure: (1) private sector interests seeking to open 
Chile’s small market to the global economy; (2) the perceived need to develop a policy 
framework that can address and avoid the so-called ‘resource curse’; and (3) domestic 
calls for more social policy and better labour rights. The remainder of this paper expands 
upon this basic argument in the following manner. First, it discusses the literature on 
globalisation, resource governance and economic development.  Second, it traces the 
politicised role of copper in Chilean economic development. And finally, it discusses 
some of the problems and issues arising from the policy of continuity of La Concertación 
regime.     
 
Globalising Latin America: The Political Economy of Resource Governan Globalising Latin America: The Political Economy of Resource Governan Globalising Latin America: The Political Economy of Resource Governan Globalising Latin America: The Political Economy of Resource Governance ce ce ce         
    
Within the context of Latin American political economy, globalisation has typically been 
associated with the rise and fall of neoliberal economics. For unlike other regions, the 
governing elites in Latin America have embraced this development model that shifted 
import substitution industrialisation (ISI) strategies under authoritarian leaderships – 
bureaucratic  authoritarianism  (BA)  –  towards  market-led  governance  under  at  least 
formally democratic regimes (Grugel, 2009; and Grugel & Riggirozzi, 2009). In this 
sense, globalisation is a process of historical change that is reflected in the shifting policy 
paradigms  and  ideological  debates  around  models  of  development.  From  a  policy 
perspective, globalisation refers broadly to the sweeping market reforms initiated since 
the late 1980s in response to the failures of the BA model. Under this paradigm, the state 
– conceived as a political actor with roles in various spheres – holds legitimate authority 
to direct the economy towards industrialisation. Rather than relying on the market and its 
laws of supply and demand, the state ‘politicises capitalism’ and structures the capacity of 
businesses to organise their interests.3 But such a belief in the state as the principal actor 
of development was reversed as states came under attack by one crisis after another. The 
1982 debt crisis signalled the beginning of a shift away from this fledgling development Globalisation and Copper Policy in Chile, Nem Singh 
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model,and  subsequent  economic  crises  (which  have  typically  characterised  critical 
junctures of change in Latin America) created conditions for radical market reforms. At 
the same time, social discontent saw pressure applied to the state and governing elites by 
labour unions and grassroots social movements who sought to open up the political 
system. Latin America therefore underwent a dual transition: politically, the state was 
transformed by a commitment amongst governing elites towards liberal democracy; and 
economically, by discrediting the authoritarian state, its ISI model was also dismantled 
and replaced with neoliberal policy and ideology (Gonzalez, 2008; and Grugel, 2009). 
The state was now seen as the main obstacle to growth and development.  
With the eclipse of state activism, private firms were given greater legitimacy as 
actors of development; indeed they were the central to the free market model which we 
saw unravel over the course of the 1990s. The process of market reform typically came in 
two phases, where the first aimed to stabilise the economy and keep inflation under 
control, while the second promoted a new round of more complex reforms designed to 
complement  the  initial  ones.  The  success  of  these  reforms  varied  across  countries 
depending on the cohesiveness of the governing coalition, their ties with international 
financial networks, and the effectiveness of the political strategies through which they 
implemented their reforms (Naim, 1999, 1994; Margheritis & Pereira, 2007; Teichman, 
2001; and Wise, 2003). Whilst mining reforms in most Latin American countries were 
being implemented in the second phase during the 1990s, Chile was exceptional in its 
early adoption. By 1974, the authoritarian regime initiated the process of creating an 
institutional framework aimed at attracting foreign investment and recognising the right 
of ownership of mines through a concessionaire system. In 1983, this was consolidated 
through the codification of the Mining Code. Mining governance in Chile is far more 
institutionalised in comparison to other Latin American countries where partial reforms 
were enacted by elected democratic governments in the 1990s.  
From a political perspective, globalisation has transformed the role of the state 
in response to market-led governance, with the withdrawal of state involvement from key 
economic  functions  coming  alongside  a  shift  towards  more  ‘minimal’  regimes  of 
regulation  (Cerny,  1995).  As  market  reforms  are  implemented  throughout  Latin 
America,  the  style  of  leadership  has  typically  taken  a  draconian  form  through 
authoritarian methods, such as the use of executive decrees, non-consultative methods of 
decision-making,  and  the  extensive  use  of  patronage  networks  to  co-opt  resistance, 
although all are accompanied by an appeal to nominally democratic processes such as 
elections  (Cook,  2007;  Grindle,  2000;  Grugel,  2009;  and  Teichman,  2001).  These 
notions do not fully capture the nuances of the Chilean case where there is a marked 
continuity in state governance from Pinochet’s neoliberal model and throughout the 
transformation of the state towards neo-structuralism. Because neoliberal reforms were 
completed under the authoritarian regime, the state under the governing coalition, La Journal of Critical Globalisation Studies, Issue 3 (2010) 
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Concertación  Democrática  (1990-2010),  has  promoted  policy  reforms  within  and 
beyond the extractive sector that constitute a steering role for the state – it has practiced a 
form of state intervention that conforms with the demands of the market and yet also 
seeks to remedy the costs of neoliberal reform. 
Finally, globalisation as an actual  process of  historical  change signifies real 
interconnectedness in political, economic, social, and cultural spheres, intentionally or 
otherwise, by a multitude of actors. As such, globalisation is not a force on its own, but 
rather it is a process driven by the actions of actors, and is therefore contestable and can 
be made to move in different directions. Latin America has become the new frontier of an 
expanding extractive sector as a result of the sustained demands of emerging markets like 
India  and  China.  Chinese  FDI  inflows  were  directed  mainly  to  the  mineral  and  oil 
sectors; roughly ¾ of the stocks that came in 2007 were of a ‘resource-seeking’ nature 
with Argentina,  Brazil, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela as the  main recipients (Jenkins, 
2009).4 In Chile, Chinese FDI has gone solely to the copper sector, which reflects the 
compatibility of the Chilean production and export structure with Chinese demands for 
raw materials (Barton, 2009). Figure 2 shows FDI inflow in mining and in the Chilean 
economy in general (see end of article). With the rise of China as both a major importer 
and exporter comes a new division of labour between countries. Concomitantly, Latin 
America’s economic relationship is slowly shifting away from the United States, which 
has historically been hegemonic through its foreign policy of market liberalisation and 
regional integration. We find new dynamics in the Latin American political economy 
marked by both competitive and complementary relations especially in industrial and 
manufacturing sectors (Jenkins, 2009; and Philips, 2007), although the extent to which 
this will continue and be fortified in the future remains unclear. 
 
Politicising Resource Governance in the Context of Post Politicising Resource Governance in the Context of Post Politicising Resource Governance in the Context of Post Politicising Resource Governance in the Context of Post- - - -Neoliberalism  Neoliberalism  Neoliberalism  Neoliberalism     
    
Market reforms are not a natural and uniform process; they have been implemented 
partially and sometimes in ways that depart from their original rationale (Pinheiro et al., 
2004; and Teichman, 2001). This also typically occurs under conditions of coercion as in 
labour reforms (Cook, 2007) or undemocratic practices (Grugel, 2009). In fact, market 
reform has been widely contested as neoliberalism became costly for ordinary citizens 
and social organisations from the grassroots to national levels called for democratisation 
from below. In Latin America, the broad rejection of neoliberalism was marked by the 
capture of state power through elections by ‘leftist’ coalitions. The literature on Latin 
American  political  economy  since  2000  and  post-neoliberal  governance,  has  been 
grappling to understand the contestation of neoliberalisms at different scales, the form 
and substance of governance after neoliberalism, and the consequences of the ‘left’ turn 
on democracy and economic development (Grugel, 2009; Grugel & Riggirozzi, 2009, Globalisation and Copper Policy in Chile, Nem Singh 
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2001; Macdonald & Rukert, 2009; and Wylde, 2009). Achieved via various forms of 
political  mobilisation,  a  new  social  contract  between  the  state  and  civil  society  is 
emerging,  which  is  distinct  from  the  more  positive,  institutionalised  state-market 
relations in Latin America (for example, Bebbington et. al., 2008; Perrault, 2008a, 2008b; 
and Sawyer, 2004). Latin America’s political regimes may be experiencing a shift in state 
governance where more resource-based models of development are emerging – as in 
Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela – and in which the state plays a more active role in the re-
regulation, re-taxation, and re-nationalisation of the minerals sector (Hogenboom, 2010; 
and Kirby, 2010).  
But whilst we find change in the role of the state in Latin America in response 
to neoliberalism, there are also countries led by governing coalitions with substantial 
leftist parties – Chile, Uruguay and Brazil being exemplary cases – whose regimes of 
capitalist accumulation have produced governance models exhibiting immense stability, 
continuity,  and  positive  state-market  relations.  Not  only  are  they  characterised  by 
continuity of market-friendly policies, but their extractive resources are also managed by 
public-private partnership which legitimise the role of the (foreign) private sector in 
economic development. With the exception of Brazil, where Petrobrás remains dominant 
in production processes in the petroleum sector and likely to exercise exclusive control 
over the newly discovered pre-sal oil fields, most of the extractive resource sectors in 
Latin  America  face  the  challenge  of  attracting  foreign  investment  and  managing 
nationalist sentiments towards natural resources.5 The consequences of globalisation for 
economic development, and its corollary relationship with democracy, are historically 
specific and contextual to state-market-society relationships produced by the specific way 
neoliberalism has been embedded, and in some cases contested, in society (Kurtz & 
Brooks, 2008; and Radcliffe, 2005). Resource governance therefore offers one way to 
examine  the  spaces  of  contestation  and  of  state  autonomy  through  which  new 
developmental state strategies take shape. 
Since 2000, we find two lefts in post-neoliberal Latin America. Whilst some 
characterise the new political economy as being divided between the ‘good’ and ‘bad’ lefts 
(Castañeda, 2006; and Castañeda & Morales, 2008), others take a more neutral view by 
looking at their social bases and the terms of state governance (see Grugel & Riggorozzi, 
2009 for a full discussion). Kirby (2010), for example, offers a characterisation of Latin 
American regimes based on their dependence on extractive resources, and the way they 
utilise these as bases of political power. Hence, the politics of resources and the broader 
changes in Latin American political economy cannot be easily disentangled. 
We need also to recognise that mining is not the same as the industrial or 
manufacturing sectors. It generates a specific form of political mobilisation via those 
communities affected by mining expansion projects, and it often makes resource policy 
discourses  more  conflictual  due  to  the  ways  mining  reforms  have  typically  been Journal of Critical Globalisation Studies, Issue 3 (2010) 
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implemented  (Gunvald  Nilsen,  2008;  Perrault,  2008a,  2008b;  and  Sawyer,  2004). 
Meanwhile, both academics and development practitioners look to resource policy as a 
potentially innovative way to link resource wealth and social development (World Bank, 
2006). Resource extraction is also associated with various political developments, such as 
administrative reform, (de-) democratisation, transparency and good governance, and 
corporate social responsibility initiatives (Brautigam et. al., 2008; Dunning, 2008; Gallo, 
2008;  Karl,  1997;  and  Ross,  2001,  1999).  Resource  governance  is  thus  intensely 
politicised  in  Latin  America.  This  includes  Chile,  where  modes  of  de-politicisation 
emerged alongside increasingly technocratic forms of mining management. 
On the one hand, we can speak of mining management as something that 
refers to the technical aspects of mining – investment policy, processing of environmental 
impact assessments (EIAs), mining closure and other regulations. This kind of apolitical 
discussion  of  copper  policy  appears  because  those  taking  the  perspective  of  mining 
experts, economists, and engineers see mining in terms of productivity and as a question 
of  efficiency.  However,  resource  governance  is  intrinsically  linked  to  economic 
development  and  is  therefore  intensely  political  and  contested.  For  example,  state 
institutions can include and exclude certain discourses within policy domains of mining, 
and policy-makers distribute rents among social and political actors. This reflects the 
ability of states to gear mining towards particular forms of economic development.  
 
Mining as a Special Sector Mining as a Special Sector Mining as a Special Sector Mining as a Special Sector    
    
Extractive resources – nitrate, mining, petroleum, natural gas, etc. – typically produce a 
strong alliance between state and business, and in some cases where there are no national 
capacities for developing the industry, an alliance with foreign capital. Such collaboration 
between  state  and  capital  to  share  responsibility  in  the  extractive  industry  makes 
competing claims more conflictual and sometimes violent, as in cases of civil strife (Karl, 
1997; Ross, 2006; Smith, 2004; and Uldefer, 2007). For one, natural resources produce 
rents,6 which are subjected to sectoral and elite interests who attempt to capture the state 
and share mining rents. Without state institutions autonomous from these social groups, 
the state becomes an instrument of elite and/or sectoral interests. And where labour 
needs to be pacified in the name of stability in governance, the state and business firms 
enter into negotiations with labour unions whose aristocratic status is marked by high 
salaries and generous welfare benefits.7 In the past, labour and societal animosity against 
foreign capital led to the nationalisation of extractive industries, but this has only re-
emerged in a few countries that are committed to a radical political economy (e.g. Bolivia, 
Ecuador, Venezula).8 Incidentally, Brazil and Chile still have state-owned companies but 
the state attempts to avoid alienating foreign firms in the mining and petroleum sectors. 
In fact, from the 1990s onwards, both countries showcase an immense stability in legal Globalisation and Copper Policy in Chile, Nem Singh 
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frameworks and continuity in extractive policies, and a persistence in courting foreign 
investment. This is reflected in the broader policy agenda to maintain the economic 
growth model (Grugel & Riggorrozzi, 2009).  
With  regard  to  the  resource  curse,  asset  immobility  and  geographical 
concentration  of  resources  allow  for  the  development  of  the  mining  sector  without 
necessarily linking it to the productive sectors (Brautigam, 2008; Dunning, 2008, pp. 6; 
and  Hammond,  2009).  Without  this  linkage  between  the  resource  and  productive 
sectors, it becomes difficult to diversify the economy. Zaire and Venezuela are cases 
where the economy successfully made a turn-around from an agriculture-based economy 
towards copper- and oil-based economy respectively. Resource dependence also leads to 
over-consumption, weak diversification of the economy, and what it commonly known as 
Dutch disease. As the natural resource profit inflow increases, real exchange rates rise, 
pushing  labour  costs  up  and  making  other  non-resource  based  tradable  goods  less 
competitive. This occurs in periods of resource booms, and as the real exchange rates 
appreciate, it cripples other non-resource based sectors, especially agriculture. The overall 
effect is to further isolate mining from other industries, which traps the country into a 
cycle of resource dependence and vulnerability to international shocks.  
Finally, natural resource dependence undermines the quality of the political 
institutions that govern resource extraction by forcing a choice between taxation and 
borrowing  as  means  of  financing  extractive  industries.  Since  minerals  are  immobile 
compared  to  other  goods  or  services,  taxation  serves  as  direct  state  revenue.  Some 
governments  negotiate  tax  regimes  on  the  basis  of  a  contractual  logic,  for  instance; 
revenue bargaining between the tax collector and the taxpayer stems from the need of the 
state for revenues and the desire of taxpayers to acquire public services. Since both parties 
have  interests  to  be  represented,  political  institutions  emerge  based  on  a  liberal 
democratic logic of representation to enhance transparency and accountability.  On the 
other hand, the relative ease in taxing minerals not only makes it less likely for the state to 
develop  a  competent  system  of  tax  collection  for  transparency  purposes,  but  it  also 
promotes  coercive  taxation  in  agrarian  economies  or  those  with  a  large  informal 
economy (Brautigam, 2008). Tax reforms today focus on improving the institutional 
capacity to collect taxes, the transparency and state accountability of expenditures, and 
the ability to generate social development without running public deficits. The need for 
sustainable  revenue  management  and  decision-making  on  mining  licenses  and 
concessions further complicate resource governance. Oftentimes, mining resources are 
associated  with  increasing  centralisation  of  power  at  the  expense  of  democratic 
accountability, the mobilisation of social groups to gain more share of the mineral rents, 
and the deterioration of public and especially bureaucratic institutions as a result of the 
politicisation of mining management (Brautigam, 2008; Dunning, 2009; Karl, 1997; and 
Mejía Acosta & de Renzio, 2008).   Journal of Critical Globalisation Studies, Issue 3 (2010) 
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Ultimately, the process of building independent institutions is hampered. For 
many resource dependent states, not only does mining foster the stability of authoritarian 
regimes or authoritarian styles of decision-making, it also consolidates the rentier class 
who serve as gatekeepers of the political process (Beblawi, 1990; and Ross, 2001, 1999). 
With an underdeveloped national tax system resting on a typical strategy of excessively 
taxing the mining sector, the state develops methods of imposition to assert its role in 
industrialisation (Beblawi & Luciani, 1987).9 In fact, the Indonesian case demonstrates 
that the break down of the rent-seeking pattern is the key to democratic transition and 
the emergence of a political will to strengthen institutions and move towards developing 
other sectors such as agriculture (Karl, 1997, pp. 208-213; and Rosser, 2007).10 In the 
next section, the paper problematises Chile’s model of resource governance, focusing in 
particular on how neoliberal reforms have imposed constraints on more statist resource 
policy.  
 
Demystifying Chilean resource governance Demystifying Chilean resource governance Demystifying Chilean resource governance Demystifying Chilean resource governance    
    
Chilean  copper  governance  reflects  the  tensions  manufactured  by  this  process  of 
balancing market-friendly policies and state regulation, as well as the limits and strengths 
of its resource based development model. Beneath the success there are tensions within 
the  model.  Prior  to  the  neoliberal  reforms,  one  of  Latin  America’s  strongest  labour 
movement  emerged  from  the  mining  towns  of  Northern  Chile,  in  which  unions 
contested and fought for the nationalisation of copper in 1971. Chile’s history of resource 
extraction from nitrate to copper demonstrates the tensions and conflicts between the 
state,  transnational  and  domestic  capital,  and  labour  unions.  From  the  statist 
developmentalist  period  (1938-1973)  to  the  neoliberal  restructuring  (1974-1990), 
copper mining was at the centre of labour conflicts and of radical political change in 
Chile. Subsequently, the consolidation of market-oriented reforms in the mining sector 
and in the wider economy by 1990 reflects new capital-labour relations mediated by a 
reformed  state  under  La  Concertación  Democrática  committed  to  neoliberal 
globalisation at least rhetorically.  
 
Legacies of dictatorship and Politics of Continuity in Chile Legacies of dictatorship and Politics of Continuity in Chile Legacies of dictatorship and Politics of Continuity in Chile Legacies of dictatorship and Politics of Continuity in Chile    
    
Resource governance in Chile has undergone changes in conjunction with this broader 
political trajectory. The immense capacity of institutions to withstand such changes – the 
shift from statist developmentalism (1930-1973) to Pinochet’s neoliberal revolution – 
reflects a state strength that was historically accumulated. For instance, whilst most of its 
Latin American counterparts failed to develop viable taxation systems, Chile by the time 
it entered the War of the Pacific against Bolivia and Peru in 1879 was collecting tax Globalisation and Copper Policy in Chile, Nem Singh 
 
 
69 
income that would have financed the war (Kurtz, 2009, pp. 492). The centralisation of 
authority and development of administrative capacity for revenue extraction, both of 
which serve as foundations for the elite political control necessary for state-building, has 
been lacking in most Latin American states (Centeno, 2002; Kurtz, 2009, pp. 486-487; 
and Tilly, 1992). Instead, political and economic elites resisted wealth redistribution – 
such as land reforms, or the creation of meritocratic bureaucracies to facilitate institution-
building  –  and  on  the  whole  this  still  underpins  the  persistent  weakness  of  Latin 
American states (Ondetti, 2008, pp. 10-13, 107; Schneider, 1999; and Wittman, 2009, 
pp. 121-122).  
And as the resource curse thesis posits, many developing countries struggle to 
simultaneously  manage  political  conflicts  around  rents  and  complete  administrative 
reforms to protect the economy from international price fluctuations and Dutch disease 
(Karl, 1997; and Ross, 2001). In Chile, however, the period of state developmentalism in 
Chile between 1930 and 1973 was the most critical in terms of centralising its authority 
and expanding its jurisdiction (Kurtz, 2009; Taylor, 2006; and Valenzuela, 1978). The 
expansion  of  the  state  started  during  the  Pedro  Aguirre  Cerda’s  Popular  Front 
government in 1938 and gained momentum in Salvador Allende’s presidency. Although 
it constantly met resistance from the conservative parties, its main legacy is the gradual 
institutionalisation  of  the  state  in  economic  management.  In  promoting  import 
substitution  strategy,  the  Corporación  de  Fomento  (CORFO)  was  established  to 
provide technical assistance in developing infant industries and its role was sustained 
until  the  move  to  nationalise  banks  and  state-owned  companies  occurred  under 
Allende.11 In a corporatist fashion, the state expanded its role by mediating directly in 
capital-labour  relations.  The  1931  labour  code  involved  state-sanctioned  collective 
bargaining, wage-setting, and state-sponsored labour mobilisation through unionisation 
(Taylor, 2006; and Valenzuela, 1978).12 This comes as an important point given that the 
militant mining workers were the major source of political conflict between the state and 
society. The fierce battle among foreign capitalists, labour unions, and the governing 
elites  was  only  resolved  in  1971  through  a  cross-party  agreement  towards  the 
nationalisation of copper. As history shows, state intervention in Chile ended bitterly 
through a military coup led by Augustus Pinochet Duarte in September 1973.  
There is already substantive work on the reasons why Salvador Allende fell 
from power (Valenzuela, 1978; and Vergara, 1985). What must be noted is the new role 
that the state took after laying out the foundations of the new economic model. Broadly 
speaking, neoliberal reforms reversed all the economic policies of Allende, particularly the 
nationalisation of key industries, universal welfare systems, and protectionism through 
tariffs  and  quantitative  restrictions.  Kurtz  (2001)  explains  that  the  Chilean  state 
reoriented economic production by withdrawing the state from direct management – for 
instance,  by  allowing  the  collapse  of  existing  industries  like  textile  and  traditional Journal of Critical Globalisation Studies, Issue 3 (2010) 
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agriculture and aligning Chile’s investment policy towards the natural resources in which 
it  had  a  comparative  advantage.  The  state  played  a  ‘neutral’  role  as  regulator 
implementing  the  law  so  as  to  allow  market  forces  to  guide  production,  and  it  also 
maintained a ‘liberal neutrality’ in its import and export regimes.   
Whilst massive privatisation was taking place, copper mining was retained in 
state  hands.  On  1  April  1976  through  Decree  Laws  1.349  and  1.350,  the  state 
consolidated  the  administration  of  copper  production  by  creating  the  unified  state-
owned company Corporación Nacional del Cobre de Chile (CODELCO). This may 
come as a surprise, but in fact it was a logical outcome of the correlation of political forces 
within the military regime. Between 1974 and 1980, Chile’s first phase of neoliberal 
restructuring, there were clear fault lines within the regime between the elite technocrats 
(‘the  Chicago  Boys’)  and  the  military  officers  who  took  administrative  posts  in 
CODELCO. This set of military generals was considered to be the strong nationalist 
faction in the balance of power of the military regime, and they were resistant to the 
privatisation  of  copper  mining.  Throughout  the  Pinochet  period  CODELCO  was 
managed  by  the  military  and  they  saw  copper  as  emblematic  of  patriotism.  Vergara 
(1985), for example, shows how the regime’s national security doctrine was intricately 
tied to copper policy. Furthermore, the armed forces until October 2009 were receiving 
10% of CODELCO’s profits to pay for arms purchases and modernisation projects. The 
direct benefit of the copper industiry to the military as an institution in terms of revenues 
meant that it made sense keeping it in state hands. But we must not forget that their 
opposition  against  the  privatisation  of  copper  became  the  critical  juncture  for  the 
continuity of the model in the 1990s. Under La Concertación, the state maintained a 
balancing  role  of  supporting  private  sector  initiatives  and  keeping  CODELCO  a 
competitive  firm  in  the  copper  industry.  During  the  2009  presidential  elections,  no 
presidential candidate suggested the privatisation of the company. Even after the victory 
of the right coalition, Alianza, Sebastian Piñera remains silent about the issue and most 
discussions on copper policy still revolve around making Chile less vulnerable from price 
shocks especially now given the current high prices. In fact, the new government seems to 
be  consistently  in  support  of  expanding  investment  in  CODELCO  to  enhance  its 
productive and labour capacities.  
But  copper  mining  has  a  special  political  resonance  in  Chile.  The 
nationalisation  was  a  fierce  struggle  in  which  labour  unions  fought  for  the  right  of 
Chileans to benefit more from their natural resource. This occurred in the context of a 
highly polarised society with sharp divisions between political parties in pre-1973 Chile. 
This achievement to forge consensus amongst political parties to nationalise copper was 
taken as caution. And indeed, Chileans today ascribe some form of cultural identity to 
copper because of the country’s history of mining.13 In the Constitution, the State has the 
ultimate subsoil rights in mining and declares the Chilean public as the ultimate owners Globalisation and Copper Policy in Chile, Nem Singh 
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of copper. Such nationalist sentiments are captured by the continued public support for 
CODELCO  as  the  main  copper  producer.  In  the  aftermath  of  the  neoliberal 
restructuring,  CODELCO’s  raison  d’être  is  to  create  the  balance  between  state 
production and private sector investment in mining. In the words of mining expert Juan 
Carlos Guajardo: 
 
CODELCO is the result of all the political conflicts around mining during the 
1950s,  1960s...  Besides  this  origin,  CODELCO  then  played  a  key  role  in 
promoting the development of national capability in mining, I mean small 
companies on technology and engineering, the domestic productive factors 
were boosted by CODELCO in mining... But a third aspect is… after the 
institutional changes during the military regime, the existence of CODELCO 
from my point of view has served as a buffer factor to avoid conflicts between 
private sector and the political sector [class]. [Its] existence... is at certain point 
an  element  that  provides  support  to  the  institutional  regime  in  [Chilean] 
mining.  Why?  All  the  people,  Chileans,  who  believe  that  all  the  copper 
resources should be nationalised are happy that CODELCO exists and that 
CODELCO  has  the  first  position  in  the  world  copper  production.  This 
political scenario allows for the private sector to develop in a more positive way 
without the questioning of the political class who believe copper should only 
be Chilean (2009, Interview with the author). 
 
However,  the  neoliberal  model  which  led  to  privatised  mining  governance  contains 
contradictions. Pinochet retained state production through CODELCO whilst aiming to 
bring in foreign capital by making mining attractive for foreign investment. By issuing 
Decree Law 600 in 1974, the Foreign Investment Statute, Pinochet gave companies 
generous  tax  rebates  for  imports  used  in  mining  operations,  permitted  delays  in  tax 
payments, and provided a guarantee that the rules would remain stable and unchanging. 
The government likewise compensated companies from the nationalisation of copper, 
which helped to recuperate the confidence of foreign capitalists. With the fierce hand of 
the dictatorship, José Piñera, Labour Minister and key supporter of the Chicago Boys, 
produced a labour code in 1979 that institutionalised labour flexibilisation. To assert the 
property rights of individuals, the Mining Code was issued in 1983. This was described as 
the act of giving the individual the absolute right to own mining concessions – a process 
that opened opportunities for Chileans (mainly national economic elites) and not just 
transnational  companies  to  take  advantage  of  the  liberalised  laws  in  mining. 
Fundamentally, there is recognition of a role for private sector, and consequently of the 
need to protect the private property rights regime. 
In  addition,  due  to  the  state’s  commitment  to  re-establish  private  sector Journal of Critical Globalisation Studies, Issue 3 (2010) 
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confidence, firms were given wide access to policy processes (Teichman, 2001), and in 
mining,  organised  business  was  able  to  direct  copper  policy.  During  the  democratic 
period, the Consejo Minero (Mining Council) and the Sociedad Nacional de Minería 
(SONAMI) were able to take advantage of the privatised legal framework. Although the 
former was only created in 1998, the latter has been in existence since 1883. Their key 
function  is  to  make  sure  business  interests  are  publicly  visible,  and  under  La 
Concertación’s terms in office, that they are given sufficient support from the Right. By 
the 1990s, La Concertación’s political capacity to steer the economic direction away from 
the  free  market  model  was  reduced.  After  the  dictatorship,  the  mining  sector  was 
perceived  as  more  efficient  because  of  private  sector  efforts  to  modernise  mining 
operations, enhance community relations through their social responsibility agenda, and 
develop a system of environmental mitigation and compensation. In comparison to the 
negative view on private capital in the 1960s-1970s, the 1990s is the era in which private 
sector  has  been  recognised  as  a  legitimate  political  actor  essential  for  economic 
development.  Although  the  state  has  been  reserved  certain  rights,  such  as  invoking 
licenses, it has never been used in recent history for fear of sending the wrong signal to the 
private sector. Mining liberalisation led to the most interesting outcome in Chile today: 
despite nationalisation of copper, roughly 70% of Chilean mineral production is done by 
the private sector whereas 30% is produced by CODECLO and Enami (see Figure 2).   
 
Labour relations under conditions of priv Labour relations under conditions of priv Labour relations under conditions of priv Labour relations under conditions of privatised governance atised governance atised governance atised governance    
    
The second consequence of Pinochet’s neoliberalism relates to labour relations. After the 
Labour Code was institutionalised, Chile’s labour flexibility was hailed by the World 
Bank and IMF for its ‘sound labour relations’. As Figure 3 shows, the Chilean labour 
market  is  typically  characterised  by  a  decline  in  protests  and  increase  in  convenio 
colectivo,14 both of which generate an image of peaceful labour relations. Whilst most 
workers in many sectors face more precarious labour conditions, mining workers with 
their powerful and organised unions have managed to defend their economic demands. 
With the plethora of social benefits, bonuses and high salaries for permanent workers and 
fairly better conditions for subcontracted workers, labour  conflicts have  largely been 
averted in the mining sector (Cook, 2007; and Winn, 2004). Crucial to successful mining 
operation is the continuity of production and minimal labour conflicts. The strength of 
the Chilean state was once more demonstrated when Pinochet put labour in its place, 
that is, tied it to the whims of capitalists and undermined its capacity to mobilise. Using 
both  coercion  and  labour  policy,  organised  labour,  including  mining  unions,  were 
stripped  off  their  collective  rights  to  unionise  and  make  collective  bargaining  with 
employers. Because the institutionalisation of most of the anti-labour legislation in Latin 
America occurred under the dictatorship, it was successfully completed without any form Globalisation and Copper Policy in Chile, Nem Singh 
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of  dissent.  What  scholars  note  is  that  this  labour  code  remains  intact  in  terms  of 
substance throughout the La Concertación days (Frank, 2002; and Winn, 2004). The 
remarkable  continuity  in  the  labour  policy  framework  in  Chile  –  one  that  favours 
employers  and  businesses  in  the  name  of  competitiveness  and  labour  flexibility  – 
demonstrates  the  state’s  capacity  of  keeping  a  coherent  policy  direction  albeit  in 
neoliberal terms. 
But what is unique in the transition is the high level of control exerted by the 
state  in  the  process.  By  silencing  labour,  banning  any  form  of  collective  action,  and 
isolating the technocrats from social pressures, the coalition of domestic big business, 
military, and international financial institutions has successfully managed the economic 
transformation in Chilean political economy (Teichman, 2001; and Vergara, 1985). For 
more than 10 years, labour reforms since 1990 were sought, but almost always failed to 
gain any concessions through tripartite negotiations  with the state and big business. 
Amongst their demands, the most crucial include removing the right of employers to fire 
workers  on  strikes,  compelling  employers  to  reveal  information  during  collective 
negotiations,  and  securing  the  right  to  collective  bargaining  for  transitory  and  inter-
enterprise unions. There were enough constraints to enable policy reforms under the 
democratic period: the Right opposition was given an important veto in Senate, political 
parties  moved  towards  the  centre,  and  consensual  politics  helped  to  avert  political 
conflicts similar to those of the Allende era. More radical proposals for labour rights were 
abandoned by the left and centre parties, and Chile today keeps in place laws for labour 
protection but not for collective labour rights.15  
The high expectations of labour unions for a renewed alliance between the 
state and labour were not met. Politicians of the governing coalition were simply afraid of 
the return of chaos reminiscent of the Allende days. There was explicit and outright 
discontentment  of  the  national  trade  union  CUT  on  the  labour  reform  programme 
implemented under President Patricio Aylwin. Other than formally recognising the right 
to unionisation and right to collective bargaining, the reforms were piecemeal and have 
maintained the pro-business labour code (Frank, 2004, 2002). In the beginning of 1990s, 
the governing coalition sought to promote labour rights in two fronts: the restoration of 
labour rights abolished during the dictatorship, and the modernisation of labour relations 
(Vergara, 2008, pp. 191). But at the heart of the democratic regime’s social concertation 
project is the reformulation of the role of the state: the government must modify the legal 
institutions inherited from the Pinochet regime in accordance with negotiations between 
employers  and  workers  but  the  government  cannot  in  any  way  interfere  in  labour 
management policies of employers and essentially follows an ‘off-limits’ approach to 
capital-labour  relations  (Frank,  2004,  pp.  81).  In  consolidating  the  export-oriented 
economy, the governing coalition’s responsibility is to keep social peace, address the 
inequalities and poverty brought about by 17 years of structural market reforms under Journal of Critical Globalisation Studies, Issue 3 (2010) 
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the dictatorship, and promote an environment conducive for domestic and transnational 
private investors. 
In practice, subcontracting and labour flexibility are deemed as necessary for 
competitiveness and better productive capacity for Chilean enterprises. For example, 
there are around 43,289 contracted workforce and 18,211 permanent workers as of 2007 
in the state-owned company (CODELCO, 2007, pp. 98-99). Although the figure varies 
in  the  private  sector,  subcontracting  is  similarly  practised  by  the  private  firms  and 
collective  negotiations  have  typically  carried  economic  issues  of  these  workers.  The 
implication is that subcontracted labour performs the job that permanent workers do. 
There are clear implications for labour rights on this aspect because permanent workers 
receive the full benefits offered by the principal companies whilst subcontracted workers 
are  offered  less  to  maximise  cost-effective  labour  management.  Mining  unions  have 
therefore  characterised  their  relationship  with  the  management  as  one  in  ‘constant 
tensions and frictions’.  
On the whole, resource governance underwent transformation as the Chilean 
neoliberal  model  unravelled  under  the  dictatorship.  In  the  aftermath  of  the  political 
transition, La Concertación inherited a very stable system of governance marked by pro-
private sector legal framework and pro-employer labour code. Chile’s dual political and 
economic transition is therefore exceptional in Latin America. Politically, the transition 
was  a  stable  transfer  of  power  through  an  institutionalised  process  designed  by  the 
authoritarian regime. The most significant consequence is the creation of a ‘protected’ or 
‘tutelary’ democracy, in which remnants of the power of the Right and its authoritarian 
past – or authoritarian enclaves – still pervade in policy-making and in the public sphere 
more  generally  (González,  2008,  pp.  38-46).16  Economically,  there  were  clear  policy 
constraints as a result of the political process that led to a depoliticising of governance and 
a  continuation  of  that  governance  model.  State-market  relations  exhibit  elements  of 
labour flexibility and privatisation, and consequently workers and unions have never 
recuperated their relationship with the state. The Chilean state under La Concertación 
responded to the pressures of globalisation by carefully managing (or averting) conflicts. 
These  elements  exemplify  the  incredible  state  capacity  to  control  the  political  and 
economic transitions, and in retaining policy ideas of privatised governance as a new 
model of development.  
 
Depoliticising Copper Policy under La Concertación  Depoliticising Copper Policy under La Concertación  Depoliticising Copper Policy under La Concertación  Depoliticising Copper Policy under La Concertación     
    
One key feature of the new politics in Latin America is the way leftist governments 
respond to the political pressures of redistribution, and in some cases, social inequality 
historically constructed by institutionalised marginalisation as in Bolivia and Ecuador. 
Central  to  their  platforms  is  the  use  of  natural  resource  revenues  to  fund  social Globalisation and Copper Policy in Chile, Nem Singh 
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programmes that address these grievances. The move towards re-nationalisation and re-
taxation of extractive resources politicises how revenues must be spent. Indeed, Rafael 
Correa, Hugo Chavez and Evo Morales came to power with a platform of redistribution, 
particularly in using the natural resource revenues to pay for social programmes that aim 
to directly address poverty and inequality.  
In comparison, Chilean social policy has been marked by a commitment to 
fiscal discipline and macroeconomic stability that prohibits populist tendency towards 
social programmes (Rindefjäll, 2009). Whilst resource policies do serve redistributive 
functions, the Chilean conception of copper governance quite different. For economists, 
copper  policy  is  about  managing  copper  prices  and  making  CODELCO  more 
competitive  vis-á-vis  the  private  mining  firms.  For  mining  experts,  it  concerns 
technological  innovation  and  capacity  as  well  as  reducing  the  costs  of  mining 
exploitation.  For  the  Ministry  of  Mining  and  COCHILCO,  copper  prices,  foreign 
contracts,  and  mining  concessions  constitute  copper  policy.  There  are  no  linkages 
between  social  and  copper  policy,  and  this  is  spelled  out  in  the  Law  on  Fiscal 
Responsibility which manages copper revenues through sovereign wealth funds. Not 
only does this disallow direct payment of social programmes, it likewise gives power to 
the Ministry of Finance and Central Bank to make joint decisions on how the savings 
would be spent. Sovereign wealth funds aim to reduce Chile’s vulnerability on price 
changes, especially because mining prices ebb and flow depending on global economic 
demands. By saving copper revenues in high price periods, the revenue can offset the 
impact of low prices by injecting money into the domestic economy during this period.  
   This is compounded by anti-poverty programmes, which have been targeted 
to the poorest sectors with the aim of giving them access to the market. These constitute 
market-based instruments of social policy rather than conforming to the welfare state 
notion  of  universal  access  (Rindefjäll,  2009;  and  Taylor,  2006).  Whilst  resource 
governance under leftist governments tends to be more politicised and in some ways 
populist in the sense of using policy tools to create or consolidate social bases of political 
power, Chilean resource governance and its relationship with social policy seems to show 
another  model.  In  fact,  although  Chile’s  poverty  reduction  strategies  have  been 
considerably more successful than many Latin American countries, for example, in terms 
of positive effects of cash transfers to reduce poverty and robust social spending towards 
health and education (ECLAC, 2009, especially Chapter 2), it is far from populist and its 
resource policy has been constantly depoliticised.17     
Other  than  this  lack  of  social  component  to  its  resource  policy,  Chilean 
governance  is  marked  by  the  centrality  of  technopols  in  decision-making.  The 
institutional privilege of the Ministry of Finance – which sits on CODELCO’s Board of 
Directors  and  decides  on  the  use  of  the  stabilisation  funds  –  guarantees  ideological 
coherence and consistency in the goals of economic, social, and copper policies.  The Journal of Critical Globalisation Studies, Issue 3 (2010) 
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Ministry, which rose to power due to the efforts of the Chicago Boys to depoliticise 
economic  decision-making  during  Pinochet’s  era,  makes  fundamental  decisions  as 
regards state investment in CODELCO. In contrast, the model of governance assigns 
roles to peripheral institutions, such as the environmental and labour ministries, whose 
involvement in copper policy is low but nevertheless manage the negative consequences 
of copper mining. For example, CONAMA is seen by its critics as an apolitical actor 
whose only function is to issue environmental impact assessments (EIAs). Whilst issuing 
licences to operate on its own is a political act, CONAMA perceives this as a technical 
procedure that only requires compliance with the law. Although this is a tenable position, 
once conflicts erupt, as in the controversial case of Pascua Lama, CONAMA is criticised 
for its lack of resources and political will to challenge the hegemony of the pro-private 
investor discourse in Chile. The Pascua Lama project is a proposed open-pit gold mining 
of the  Andean  mountains in Argentina and Chile. To facilitate this, an international 
bilateral treaty to liberalise mining and harmonise the rules for exploration was carried 
out. Amongst other things, it will require ‘transplanting’ three glaciers to conduct open-
pit  mining,  displacing  indigenous  peoples  in  the  Andean  region,  and  changing  the 
hydraulic  cycle  (Karmy,  2009;  Oporto  Martin,  2009;  Salinas,  2009;  and  Author 
Interviews).  Transnational  Canadian  firm  Barrick  Gold  and  the  Canadian  embassy 
struggled  to  promote  the  image  of  the  company  through  its  CSR  agenda.  The 
environmental agenda – which at face value seems apolitical – appears as such because of 
the depoliticisation pursued by policymakers.  
 
Assessing the Merits of Copper Policy  Assessing the Merits of Copper Policy  Assessing the Merits of Copper Policy  Assessing the Merits of Copper Policy     
    
With such remarkable stability and continuity in policy, the Chilean model of governance 
seems  fairly  successful.  Firstly,  the  neoliberal  reforms  implemented  under  the 
dictatorship were completed and have produced the results the regime was aiming for: 
expansion  of  investment  in  mining,  an  image  of  political  and  tax  stability  in  the 
international community, and the use of copper revenues for social development. In 
terms of investment, Figure 1 shows the dramatic increase in FDI over the last 20 years 
since the anti-foreign capital policies from 1958-1973.  Without  a doubt, this can be 
credited to the image of stability that Chile has projected to businesses and governments. 
With respect to environmental regulations, my interviews with state agency officials and 
private sector indicate some sense of shared responsibility with environmental mitigation 
and compensation for those affected communities in mining. Although this is highly 
contended by other interviews, especially given the pro-private investment position of the 
state, the general point that is observed by both sides would be the steady evolution of 
environmental standards in mining. Although the environmental agency CONAMA was 
created only in 1994 through the efforts of President Aylwin, it has gone a very long way Globalisation and Copper Policy in Chile, Nem Singh 
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in institutionalising the procedures in acquiring EIAs, computerising the system, and 
establishing rules and regulations as regards mitigation and compensation measures in 
mining projects. In addition, foreign companies have been held responsible for initiating 
the creation of these rules as a result of the external pressures from the countries of origin 
of these companies. The high environmental standards imposed in Canada, Australia, 
and Western Europe have influenced the operations of these big firms in Chile. Overall, 
the Chilean case exhibits a break away from the typical story of transnational capital 
exploiting the Third World for its raw materials without environmental considerations 
(Interview with CONAMA Officer, 2009).  
Second,  with  respect  to  labour  union  mobilisation  and  capacity,  the 
relationship between CODELCO and the unions is one built on mutual respect and 
cooperation albeit filled with tensions and conflicts. This is reflected in the continuity of 
the  series  of  agreements  between  CODELCO  and  FTC  –  particularly  the  Strategic 
Alliance now on its fourth phase, and the Common Project. These documents lay down 
mutual  compromises,  such  as  in  the  shared  aims  of  modernising  the  company, 
streamlining labour and other costs, and guaranteeing job security for workers. If we use 
electoral participation as a quantitative indicator of labour mobilisation (a key indicator 
for  political  mobilisation,  used  in  Valenzuela,  1978),  the  results  show  the  sustained 
support of the labour unions to the Concertación Democrática. Figure 4 shows the 
voting trends in regions two and three, which are considered to be the main mining 
regions of Chile. They indicate the unconditional support for the presidential candidate 
in three elections in the last 20 years. They also demonstrate the role of unions in keeping 
the coalition in the government. However, they also show the closing gap between the 
two coalitions in the voting behaviour as the right-wing Alianza coalition reaches 40% 
votes  in  the  bulwark  of  Concertación  Democrática.  The  seemingly  unchanged 
relationship between labour and state cannot be compared to the pre-1973 political 
configuration, and this is due to the imposition of neoliberalism and its consequences for 
labour unions during and immediately after the dictatorship.  
However, the electoral votes hide the tensions between the party and unions as 
a  result  of  the  movement  towards  the  centre  of  Chilean  parties  generally.  The 
relationship has definitely been strained due to the repressive demobilisation policy of 
Pinochet and the fear of the parties of a return to political chaos if strong ties between 
unions and parties are re-established. Party platforms and electoral participation fail to 
reflect the overall lack of options for Chileans in terms of a viable alternative against the 
neoliberal economic model. The sustained victory of Concertación Democrática in the 
last 20 years is based on the conscious efforts and capacity of the centrist party to craft a 
negotiation with the renovated left parties of Chile. Nonetheless, whatever the Christian 
Democrats do is not as important today as in pre-1973 party politics, precisely because 
the leftist parties have secured the votes of the unions, which of course constitute the Journal of Critical Globalisation Studies, Issue 3 (2010) 
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overall alliance within the governing coalition. Effectively, the unions have maintained 
their support for the economic agenda of La Concertación, even if they have done this 
with great caution.  
 
Conclusions Conclusions Conclusions Conclusions    
    
This paper has focused on the historically contingent nature of economic and political 
change in the resource extractive sector, and the way this change has been shaped in 
Chile by the neoliberal project under Pinochet. Although the mining sector remains the 
primary source of state income –  el sueldo de Chile – the political economic dynamics in 
the last thirty years have been altered radically. With an institutionalised authoritarian 
regime  that  implemented  a  social  re-engineering  project,  the  mining  sector  has 
undergone  a  gradual  but  successful  transformation  from  statist  developmentalism 
towards  the  neoliberal  model  of  development.  The  extent  to  which  post-neoliberal 
governance  exists  in  Chile  therefore  is  subject  to  debate.  Whilst  there  have  been 
substantial efforts to move away from neoliberalism – as indicated by the social policies of 
La  Concertación  under  Lagos  and  Bachelet,  and  the  re-regulation  of  labour  abuses 
through the subcontracting law – the degree to which it can be seen to constitute a 
regulatory state needs further investigation. 
The  successful  implementation  of  the  reforms  is  reflected  in  the  new 
perception of the private sector: the business sector is now seen as a positive economic 
force  that  brought  economic  development  to  Chile.  Consequentially,  the  new 
institutions in place after the dictatorship partake in the further institutionalisation of the 
neoliberal market strategy and the deepening of the role of capital, characterised by the 
exclusion of other voices in decision-making –  such as labour and environmental groups 
–    and  the  use  of  a  competitiveness  discourse  to  advocate  governance  reforms  in 
CODELCO. Overall, we find a more complex set of policies in mining that is both an 
historical legacy of the dictatorship and a conscious political decision of the subsequent 
democratic regime.                           
    
Notes Notes Notes Notes
 
1 This accounts for the $28 billion FDI outflow in Brazil vis-à-vis the FDI inflow of $19 
billion (WIR, 2007, pp. xix). 
2 On this, see the ESRC project led by Tony Bebbington at the School of Environment 
and Development, University of Manchester entitled ‘Conflicts over the countryside: 
civil society and the political ecology of rural development in the Andean region’. 
Further  details  are  available  online  at 
http://www.sed.manchester.ac.uk/research/andes/. Globalisation and Copper Policy in Chile, Nem Singh 
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3 Schneider (1999, 2004) has written on desarollista (or developmental) states in Latin 
America, describing the Brazilian and Mexican variants and distinguishing these from 
their East Asian counterparts. 
4 FDI is typically classified as resource-seeking, market-seeking, or efficiency-seeking type. 
Whilst the latter two types are determined by investment climate, market conditions 
and production costs, FDI of the resource-seeking type is largely based on the presence 
of natural resources.  
5 Petrobrás and Vale are Brazilian firms which have started investing outside Brazil. The 
former remains state-owned whilst the latter was privatised under Fernando Cardoso. 
Petrobrás is a unique case of public-private partnership because it is not 100% state-
owned,  with  its  stocks  being  sold  in  the  market  for  private  investors.  Hence,  it 
functions both as a private and public enterprise with the dual accountability of making 
profits and defending state interests. In terms of its role in the petroleum sector, only 
the upstream activities – exploration and production – have experienced the entry of 
new foreign players. In refining, the expensive investments necessary and lower returns 
dissuade foreign firms from making investments. As such, Petrobrás still has monopoly 
in this part of the commodity chain.  
6 Rent is defined as the difference between the costs of extraction and the return from 
land, labour and capital. In the context of resource wealth, rents can be seen as super-
normal (oligopoly or monopoly) profits. 
7 In other cases, mining has a negative effect on labour. Whilst industrial production 
lowers production costs as economies of scale expand, resource extraction induces 
continuous exploitation of forests, mines, and deserts without improving the labour 
force (Bunker, 1985; and Schurman, 2001). 
8 Only Botswana (diamond) and Chile (copper) have been shown to have succeeded in 
efficiently managing the sectors through public ownership (Sachs & Warner, 2001). 
However,  nationalisation  does  not  resolve  governance  issues,  such  as  access  to 
decision-making by stakeholders, social inequality, and distribution of rents.  
9 There are however mechanisms that prevent the creation of rentier states, as shown in 
the  case  of  Venezuela,  Bolivia  and  Chile.  For  more,  see  Dunning,  2008;  and 
Hammond, 2009. 
10 In fact, Brazil is a counter case where rapidly transforming the capital goods sector 
undermined support for resource-based exports. The Brazilian development model 
from the 1930s to the 1970s emphasised industrial self-sufficiency and relied heavily 
on the primary sector. As such, the sustained shrinkage of the commodity sector and 
the failure of autarkic development policies resulted to deteriorating macro-economic 
performance (Auty, 1995). This implies that resource abundance neither has a linear Journal of Critical Globalisation Studies, Issue 3 (2010) 
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nor a necessarily causal relationship with institutional development and economic 
performance. 
11 Pressures for state intervention materialised as early as 1930s when the Compania de 
Salitre de Chile was formed, a conglomerate of foreign and Chilean nitrate producers 
with 50% shares from the state. This was taken over by the Corporación de Ventas de 
Salitre y Yodo in 1934, a move that gave the Chilean state effective control over the 
collapsing industry (Gallo, 2008, pp. 180). 
12 But one must not forget that the ultimate goal of labour corporatism in Chile was to 
control the increasingly powerful and influential labour movement. It was an act of 
securing stability and elite interests rather than an attempt to expand labour rights. 
Grugel  (2009)  points  out  that  Latin  American  democracies  are  different  on  this 
respect:  unlike  its  European  counterparts,  they  are  democracies  of  the  poor  with 
governing elites unwilling to compromise their resources.  
13 Interviews with Gustavo Lagos, Marcos Lima and two other mining experts.  
14  There  are  two  types  of  contracts  in  Chile:  convenio  colectivo,  which  are  written 
proposals by unions that employers can accept or reject; and contrato colectivo, which 
are demands with new terms of  agreement  for  collective bargaining. Interestingly, 
there was an increase in the former rather than the latter, and the reason for this is that 
workers are  more  cautious  of generating conflict with their employers. See Cook, 
2007; and Frank, 2004, 2002. 
15 Cook (2007) makes a distinction between labour protection and labour rights. Labour 
protection refers to laws that accord rights to workers individually whereas labour 
rights refer to collective rights, such as the right to organise unions,  make collective 
decisions to hold strikes, and the right of unions to negotiate above the workplace. In 
Latin America, these rights vary depending on the strength of labour unions to shape 
the labour reform agenda and the historical legacies of the democratic transitions.    
16 The key aspects of these authoritarian enclaves include: (a) according protection to 
military officers involved in the ‘internal war’ waged between 1973-1975 that led to 
human  rights  violations  at  an  alarmingly  high  level;  (b)  an  electoral  system  that 
excluded traditionally radical political parties of the left which practically created two 
types of socialist parties in Chile –  one within the Concertación Democrática and the 
other outside; (c) the establishment of a National Security Council that guaranteed 
the participation of the military in national defence policy-making and an effective veto 
power against the future president; and (d) a transition calendar that would allow the 
regime to remain in power until 1988, until which a plebiscite would be conducted to 
determine if the military regime would stay for a further eight years until 1996. 
17 Chile is grouped in the first category of countries, with Argentina, Brazil, Costa Rica, 
Panama and Uruguay, whose per capita social spending is at $1,102; the public social Globalisation and Copper Policy in Chile, Nem Singh 
 
 
81 
 
spending in relation to GDP is at 17.7%, and social spending on health and education 
as a percentage of GDP is on average 3.9% and 4.5% respectively (ECLAC, 2009, pp. 
39).  
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Figure 2: Mining Investment in Chile Figure 2: Mining Investment in Chile Figure 2: Mining Investment in Chile Figure 2: Mining Investment in Chile    
 
Source: COCHILCO Annuario, 2009. 
 
Note: Public investment includes CODELCO and ENAMI. The sharp increase in public 
investment in 2005 is due to the CODELCO’s US$ 393million Ventanas Smelter and 
Refinery Acquisition. 
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Source: Dirección del Trabajo, División de Relaciones Laborales, 2009. 
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Source: Ministerio del Interior, Gobierno de Chile, 2009. 
 
Note: The electoral system changed prior to the1999 presidential elections into a two-
rounds voting system. The results are the second-round voting.  
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